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Abstract 
In this paper we examine the impact of commodity price uncertainty on US economic activity. 
Our empirical analysis indicates that uncertainty in agricultural, energy and metals markets 
depresses US economic activity and acts as an early warning signal for US recessions. Our 
VAR analysis shows that uncertainty shocks in agricultural and metals markets have a more 
long-lasting dampening effect on US economic activity and its components, when compared to 
the effect of oil price uncertainty shocks. Finally, we show that when accounting for the effects 
of macroeconomic and monetary factors, the negative dynamic response of economic activity 
to agricultural and metals price uncertainty shocks remains unaltered, while the respective 
macroeconomic response to energy uncertainty shocks is significantly reduced due to either 
systematic policy reactions or random shocks in monetary policy.  
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1. Introduction 
The real options approach to the theory of investment under uncertainty indicates that 
firms postpone their investment decisions, or they exercise their real option to wait to 
invest in highly uncertain times, due to the irreversible nature of investment decisions. 
This ‘irreversibility’ property of investment raises firms’ ‘option value’ to delay or 
postpone their investment decisions for less uncertain times (Aguerrevere, 2009; 
Bernanke, 1983; Brennan and Schwartz, 1985; Henry, 1974; Pindyck, 1991; 1993; 
Triantis and Hodder, 1990; among others). In a similar way, uncertainty may lead to a 
reduction in employment and consumption due to a precautionary savings effect by 
economic agents (Caggiano et al., 2014; Edelstein and Killian, 2009; Schaal, 2017; 
Skinner, 1988). Hence, the overall consensus in the literature is that rising economic 
uncertainty results to a drop in aggregate investment, consumption and employment, 
which, in turn, leads to economic recessions.1 
 
A large and growing body in the literature shows the negative impact of rising 
uncertainty on the macroeconomy (Bachman et al., 2013; Baker et al., 2016; Basu and 
Bundick, 2017; Bloom, 2009; Bonciani and Van Roye, 2016; Caggiano et al., 2014; 
Caldara et al., 2016; Carriere-Swallow and Cespedes, 2013; Drechsel and Tenreyro, 
2018; Ferrara and Guérin, 2018; Ilut and Schneider, 2014; Popp and Zhang, 2016; Saijo, 
2017; among others).2 For example, Bloom (2009) shows that when uncertainty shock 
is defined as an increase in stock-market volatility, then this type of shock has a 
persistently negative impact on US economic activity, while Popp and Zhang (2016) 
show that economic uncertainty shocks, proxied by shocks in the VXO index, have 
negative effects on the US macroeconomy and the financial markets, with the impact 
of the uncertainty shock being higher in magnitude during recessionary periods. All 
these empirical studies show the negative macroeconomic effect of uncertainty shocks 
 
1 While the general consensus in the literature on investment under uncertainty is that rising uncertainty 
results to a drop in firm-level and aggregate investment, and therefore in economic activity, there are 
some studies which identify a positive effect of uncertainty shocks on investment and real output under 
specific macroeconomic conditions (Lence and Hayes, 1998; Marmer and Slade, 2018). 
2 Bloom (2009) shows that the negative impact of uncertainty shocks, which are proxied by the US stock-
market volatility, occurs because higher uncertainty leads firms to ‘temporarily pause their investment 
and hiring process’. Bachmann and Bayer (2013) find that the ‘wait-and-see’ factor in German firms is a 
key factor that affects the business cycle in the German economy. Bloom et al. (2007) empirically verify 
this evidence by showing that higher uncertainty increases firms’ real option values to wait and reduces 
their responsiveness to aggregate demand shocks. 
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by proxying economic uncertainty using stock-market volatility, the VIX index, or 
measures of uncertainty about future economic policy.  
 
In this paper, we move the current research a step further by modeling uncertainty as 
the volatility of primary agricultural (corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat), metals (copper, 
gold, platinum, silver) and energy (crude oil, heating oil, petroleum, gasoline) 
commodity prices. Commodities are highly homogeneous products that are used as 
primary inputs for the production of manufacturing products. Therefore, their price 
volatility is a significant source of uncertainty for economic agents, hence, according 
to the real options theory of investment under uncertainty, the rising commodity market 
volatility should be associated with a subsequent drop in investment, consumption, 
production and, ultimately, economic activity. Moreover, the general consensus in the 
literature is that commodity prices are driven by the forces of aggregate supply and 
demand conditions (Borensztein and Reinhart, 1994; Kilian, 2009; Roberts and 
Schlenker, 2013; among others). Therefore, a higher commodity price uncertainty 
could signal higher uncertainty about aggregate supply and demand conditions in the 
economy. This uncertainty, about aggregate demand and supply, is typically followed 
by sudden drops in economic activity (Basu and Bundick, 2017; Caggiano et al., 2014; 
Leduc and Liu, 2016; among others). The relevant literature has identified a significant 
linkage between commodity price fluctuations and the macroeconomy (Alquist et al., 
2019; Fernández et al., 2018; Fernandez-Perez et al., 2017; Ferraro and Peretto, 2018; 
Frankel and Rose, 2010; Gilbert, 2010; Karali and Power, 2013; Nocetti and Smith, 
2011; Ready, 2018; among others). For example, Ferraro and Peretto (2018) using an 
endogenous growth model show that commodity price changes are strongly correlated 
with short-run economic growth, while Fernández et al. (2018) show that a common 
factor, capturing co-movement in global commodity prices, explains more than one 
third of real output fluctuations of emerging market economies. Another strand of the 
empirical literature identifies significant linkages between monetary policy, inflation 
and commodity prices (Anzuini et al., 2013; Frankel, 1984; Frankel and Rose, 2010; 
Frankel and Hardouvelis, 1985; Gilbert, 2010; Gospodinov and Ng, 2013; Han et al., 
1990; Orden and Fackler, 1989; Scrimgeour, 2015).  
 
Motivated by the previous findings of the literature on the effects of uncertainty shocks 
and the literature which identifies the significant linkages between commodity prices 
and the macroeconomy, we empirically examine the impact of commodity price 
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uncertainty on US economic activity. To the best of our knowledge, the empirical 
literature showing the effect of commodity price uncertainty on macroeconomic 
fluctuations is limited. Previous empirical studies identify the well-known oil-
macroeconomy relationship according to which rising prices and volatility in the crude 
oil market result in depressing investment, a fall in GDP growth and economic 
recession (Elder, 2018; Elder and Serletis, 2010; Ferderer, 1996; Hamilton, 1983; 1996; 
2003; Jo, 2014; Kilian, 2009; Kilian and Vigfusson, 2011; 2013; 2017; Lee at al., 1995; 
Rahman and Serletis, 2011; Ravazzolo and Rothman, 2013; Ready, 2018). For 
example, Hamilton (1983, 1996, 2003) finds an asymmetric relationship between oil 
price changes and economic activity by showing that oil price increases have a more 
negative impact on US GDP growth when compared to the positive impact of oil price 
decreases. Lee et al. (1995) and Ferderer (1996) were among the first to identify the 
role of the conditional second moment of oil price (i.e., variability) on forecasting 
macroeconomic activity. More specifically, they find that the conditional volatility of 
crude oil prices explains significantly better GNP growth variability when compared to 
the forecasting ability of crude oil prices. The recent empirical findings of Elder (2018), 
Elder and Serletis (2010) and Jo (2014) provide further insights into the significant 
forecasting power of oil price uncertainty on economic activity.  
 
Although the studies mentioned above identify the negative macroeconomic impact of 
oil price uncertainty, there is no empirical work showing what is the macroeconomic 
impact of uncertainty in agricultural and metals commodity markets. In this paper, 
therefore, we attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining and comparing the 
macroeconomic impact of agricultural, metals and energy commodity price uncertainty 
shocks. Our results show that uncertainty shocks in agricultural, metals and energy 
commodity markets have a significant negative impact on US economic activity and its 
components. More specifically, by examining the forecasting power of commodity 
price uncertainty using the bivariate regressions on real GDP and industrial production 
growth, we report negative and statistically significant coefficients for all commodity 
series and for forecasting horizons ranging from one to six quarters. Interestingly, the 
uncertainty series of agricultural and metals commodities, like wheat, gold and 
platinum, have higher predictive power on the measures of economic activity when 
compared to the energy markets. These findings are the first to show the significantly 
higher predictive information content of agricultural and metals commodities as 
opposed to energy commodities on US economic activity. While the previous findings 
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in the literature identify the role of oil price uncertainty shocks (Elder and Serletis, 
2010; Jo, 2014; Rahman and Serletis, 2011), we contribute to the literature by showing 
that non-oil commodity market uncertainty shocks have a more dampening effect on 
real output when compared to oil uncertainty shocks. Our evidence is in line with the 
previous findings of Karali and Power (2013) and Gilbert (2010) according to which 
agricultural prices and volatility are better explained by macroeconomic factors like the 
industrial production growth, inflation and short-term interest rates.  
 
Interestingly, while we report a significant causal relationship running from agricultural 
and metals commodity price uncertainty to economic activity, we do not find the same 
evidence for oil market uncertainty. On the contrary, we provide evidence of a reverse 
channel of causality for energy commodity markets. While the relevant literature so far 
has identified the recessionary impact of oil price uncertainty shocks (Elder and 
Serletis, 2010; Elder, 2018; Kilian and Vigfusson, 2017), our analysis identifies the 
reverse channel of causality according to which changes in US real output affect oil 
price uncertainty. These results are in line with the recent empirical findings of Van 
Robays (2016) and Bakas and Triantafyllou (2018), who empirically examine the 
impact of macroeconomic uncertainty on agricultural, metals and energy markets and 
find that macro-uncertainty shocks have the highest and more long-lasting dynamic 
effect on the volatility of energy markets. 
 
Furthermore, in order to examine the dynamic responses of economic activity to 
commodity price uncertainty shocks, we estimate a multivariate VAR model in which 
we control for various factors, suggested by the literature to affect economic activity, 
such as the slope of the US Treasury yield curve and measures of macroeconomic and 
financial uncertainty. Moreover, a number of empirical studies have shown that oil 
price shocks are inflationary and thus have attributed a large part of the recessionary 
impact of oil price shocks to the systematic monetary policy responses of the Fed, after 
the occurrence of unexpected shocks in oil prices in the fear of inflationary pressures 
(Beckerman and Jenkinson, 1986; Bernanke et al.,1997; Kara, 2017; among others).3 
 
3 There is still an ongoing lively debate in the literature about whether the recessionary impact of oil price 
shocks is genuine or it can be (at least partially) attributed to systematic reactions of the monetary 
authority in order to offset the inflationary pressures of rising oil prices. For example, while Bernanke et 
al. (1997) show that the oil shocks have been followed by contractionary monetary policy (which 
ultimately lowers output growth), Hamilton and Herrera (2004) and Kilian and Lewis (2011) find that the 
Fed does not respond (at least not so aggressively as Bernanke et al. (1997) imply) to rising oil price 
shocks, and hence the effect of rising oil prices is purely recessionary. In our multivariate VAR model, 
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Hence, in order to find the pure (net) recessionary impact of commodity price 
uncertainty shocks, we also control for endogenous interactions between commodity 
price fluctuations and monetary policy by including the money supply and the inflation 
rate as endogenous variables in our VAR model. We find that price uncertainty shocks 
of some agricultural and metals commodities (like corn, wheat, gold and platinum) have 
significantly negative effects on real GDP growth that are unrelated to inflation and 
monetary policy. The VAR analysis shows that the estimated macroeconomic impact 
of uncertainty shocks in these commodity markets remains robust to the inclusion of 
economic uncertainty measures and monetary policy instruments.  
 
In addition, we show that unlike the metals and agricultural uncertainty shocks, oil price 
uncertainty shocks become insignificant when we control for inflation and monetary 
policy. Our results are also broadly in line with the findings of Bernanke et al. (1997), 
since we show that the dampening effect of oil uncertainty shocks vanishes when we 
control for inflation and monetary policy shocks.4 In this way, our results provide new 
empirical support to the findings of Bernanke et al. (1997), who show that ‘it is not 
possible to determine how much of the decline in output is the direct result of the 
increase in oil prices, as opposed to the ensued tightening of monetary policy’.5 On the 
other hand, our VAR analysis clearly shows that this is not the case for non-oil 
commodities. The uncertainty shocks of non-oil commodities, like corn, wheat, gold 
and platinum, have a significant and long-lasting negative impact on US 
macroeconomic activity irrespectively of whether we control (or not) for monetary 
policy in the VAR system. Our multivariate VAR analysis reveals that a positive one-
standard-deviation shock in wheat price volatility results in four basis points drop in 
GDP growth four quarters after the initial uncertainty shock, with the impact remaining 
negative and statistically significant from the second until the sixth quarter after the 
 
we control for both monetary policy shocks and inflation, in order to account for possible interactions 
between commodity price uncertainty, inflation and monetary policy, and thus to identify the pure 
recessionary impact of commodity price uncertainty shocks.  
4 Bernanke et al. (1997) additionally find that the recessionary impact of oil shocks is also reduced even 
when they restrict monetary policy not to have systematic reactions to oil shocks. This means that the 
recessionary impact of oil price uncertainty shocks is either inflationary or can be attributed to systematic 
(or random) shocks-responses of the monetary authority. 
5 The relevant literature has extensively shown that on many occasions the monetary policy authority 
reacts (at some degree) to oil price shocks by raising the Fed fund rate in order to control the inflationary 
pressures of these shocks. Bernanke et al. (1997) are the first to show that oil shocks may not be the 
primary cause of US economic recessions since the monetary authority most of the time reacts to these 
shocks by raising short-term interest rates. Thus, it is difficult to attribute economic recessions solely to 
oil price shocks. 
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initial uncertainty shock. Our results, also, show that commodity price uncertainty 
shocks affect negatively several other widely accepted proxies of economic activity, 
like the industrial production index, investment, consumption, capacity utilization and 
the unemployment rate. Our results are broadly in line with the findings of Bellemare 
et al. (2013) who show that rising agricultural price volatility has a negative effect on 
economic welfare in developing countries. Here, we additionally show that rising 
agricultural price volatility (or uncertainty) has a negative effect on aggregate 
consumption and investment of developed economies like US.  
 
Overall, we empirically verify the real options theory of ‘investment under uncertainty’ 
when modeling uncertainty as the realized variance of the daily returns of commodity 
markets. More specifically, our VAR analysis shows that aggregate investment is the 
component of GDP which is more heavily impacted by commodity price uncertainty 
shocks, hence we provide further empirical support to the real options theory of 
investment under uncertainty (Henry, 1974; Pindyck, 1991) by modeling uncertainty as 
the volatility of major agricultural, metals and energy prices. Finally, our findings 
showing the negative effects of volatility of storable commodities like corn and wheat, 
are in line with the  previous empirical evidence which shows the economic significance 
of convenience yields and inventory levels for aggregate production and consumption 
(Milonas and Thomadakis, 1997; Pindyck, 2004; Williams and Wright, 1982; Wright, 
2011). The policy implication behind our empirical findings is that policy-makers 
should turn their attention to both agricultural and metals commodity price fluctuations 
instead of perceiving oil market uncertainty shocks as the only commodity-related 
threat for the macroeconomy.6  
 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the empirical 
methodology. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents the empirical analysis, 
and Section 5 discusses our robustness checks. Finally, Section 6 concludes.  
 
 
 
6 According to this strand of the literature, the rising price volatility of storable commodities coincides 
with higher convenience yields for holding physical inventory (Milonas and Thomadakis, 1997), and thus 
lowers commodity inventory levels and results to de-stabilizing production and consumption in the 
economy (Williams and Wright, 1982). Hence, our results showing that rising volatility of corn and wheat 
prices result to a drop in US industrial production and consumption expenditures, provide further insights 
to this literature.  
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2. Methodology 
2.1 Uncertainty in Commodity Prices 
Our uncertainty measure (COMRV) is the realized variance of the daily returns of 
commodity futures. Following Ferderer (1996), we construct both quarterly and 
monthly volatility series for each commodity futures contract by computing for each 
period (quarter/month) the standard deviation of the daily returns. We calculate the 
realized variance using daily closing prices of the nearby futures contract, according to 
Equation (1) below: 
                          
2
1 1
,
1 1 1
252 T t i t i t i t i
t T
i t i t i
F F F F
COMRV
T F F
+ + − + + −
= + − + −
 − −= −   ,                              (1) 
Where Ft is the nearby commodity futures price on trading day t and 
1 1( ) /t i t i t iF F F+ + − + −−  is the average futures returns for each period (t,T). COMRVt,T is 
our estimated realized variance for each period (quarter/month).7,8 Our approach of 
estimating the realized variance using the standard deviation of daily returns is found 
to be preferable since it relies on all the information contained in the daily observations 
as compared to the approach of estimating unobservable GARCH measures of volatility 
based on quarterly or monthly commodity price series (see for example, Andersen et 
al., 2003). In simple words, the realized volatility is the actual variation that market 
participants and firms observe in the market and that, based on that variation, they take 
investment decisions and exercise (or not) their option to wait until the price variability 
reduces significantly.9 
 
2.2 Multivariate VAR Model  
Following Bernanke et al. (1997), we estimate a multivariate VAR model in which we 
control for inflation and monetary policy as endogenous variables. In this way, we 
implicitly account for the inflationary impact of commodity prices and for possible 
 
7
 The time period for the estimation of realized variance is either quarterly or monthly depending on the 
frequency of the time-series used in our econometric model. 
8 The realized variance is multiplied by 252 (the number of trading days for one calendar year) in order 
to be annualized. 
9 Our main findings remain unaltered when we use the GARCH approach of Elder and Serletis (2010) 
for the estimation of oil price uncertainty as the conditional standard deviation of a one-step ahead 
forecast error. In addition, our main findings remain unaltered when we use the GARCH (1,1) model for 
the measurement of commodity price uncertainty, although the predictability of the uncertainty series is 
slightly reduced under this methodology. These additional results can be provided upon request. 
9 
 
monetary policy reactions to commodity market turbulence (Beckerman and Jenkinson, 
1986; Carlstrom and Fuerst, 2006; Hooker, 2002; Kara, 2017; Kilian and Lewis, 2011). 
In addition, we control for proxies of macroeconomic and financial market uncertainty 
using the economic policy uncertainty (EPU) index (Baker et al., 2016) and the 
volatility of the S&P500 stock-price index (Bloom, 2009; Caggiano et al., 2017; 
Hamilton and Lin, 1996; Schwert, 1989). Moreover, in the VAR model we control for 
the slope of the US Treasury yield curve which is also a significant predictor of US 
economic activity (Estrella, 2005; Estrella and Hardouvelis, 1991). The major 
advantage of our VAR identification scheme is that we control for the major 
determinants of economic activity in the VAR setting. Thus, our VAR estimates give a 
more robust estimation compared to that of Elder and Serletis (2010) and Jo (2014), 
since these works do not include in the VAR identification any variable that controls 
for monetary policy or other proxies of macroeconomic and financial uncertainty that 
have already been proven significant indicators of US economic recessions. Following 
Bekaert et al. (2013), we choose to place the macroeconomic variables first and the 
financial variables last in the VAR ordering due to the more sluggish response of the 
former compared to the latter, while we follow Jurado et al. (2015) and place the 
uncertainty measures last in the VAR ordering.  
 
Our reduced form VAR model is given in Equation (2) below: 
 
                                          0 1 1 ...t t k t k tY A AY A Y − −= + + + +                                           (2) 
 
Where 0A  is a vector of constants, 1A  to kA  are matrices of coefficients and t  is the 
vector of serially uncorrelated disturbances, with zero mean and variance-covariance 
matrix 
' 2( , )t tE I  = . tY  is the vector of endogenous variables. The lag-length (k) in 
the VAR model is selected using the Schwarz (SBIC) optimal lag-length information 
criterion.10 To recover orthogonal shocks, we use a Cholesky decomposition with the 
following ordering in our baseline 8-factor VAR model: 
 
10 Our IRFs estimates remain robust to the choice of lags that are included in the VAR. More specifically, 
we have estimated alternative versions of the baseline multivariate VAR model using the Akaike and the 
Hannan-Quinn information criteria for selecting the optimal lag-length (k). Moreover, following Elder 
and Serletis (2010) and Jo (2014), we have also estimated the VAR model using a full year of lags (i.e. 
k=4) for all variables. The evidence from all these alternative versions of the VAR model shows that our 
main results remain unaltered, and that our findings are stable to the choice of lags used in the VAR. 
These additional results can be available upon request.  
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              [ΔGDP  INFL  UNEMP  ΔM2  TERM  EPU  SP500RV  COMRV]              (3) 
 
ΔGDP stands for the growth of real GDP (the proxy of US economic activity), COMRV 
is the realized variance of daily returns of the commodity futures prices, SP500RV is 
the realized variance of daily returns of the S&P 500 stock-market index, EPU is the 
economic policy uncertainty index, UNEMP is the unemployment rate, ΔM2 is the 
growth of M2 money supply, INFL is the inflation rate (the quarterly growth of 
consumer price index (CPI) using a rolling fixed window of four quarters) and TERM 
is the slope of the term structure of US interest rates (namely, the difference between 
the 10-year US Treasury Bond yield and the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate). We 
additionally estimate our baseline 8-factor VAR model where, instead of ΔGDP, we 
use the growth of the investment and consumption components of GDP (ΔINV and 
ΔCONS), and the growth of the industrial production index (ΔIPI), the capacity 
utilization growth (ΔCU) and the unemployment rate (UNEMP) as alternative proxies 
of economic activity in the US.11 
 
3. Data 
3.1 Commodity Data 
We obtain daily time-series data for the prices of the major S&P GSCI commodity 
futures indices from DataStream. More specifically, we obtain data for the prices of 
agricultural (corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat), metals (copper, gold, silver, platinum) and 
energy (crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, petroleum) commodity futures. Our daily 
commodity data covers the period from 1st January 1988 to 31st January 2017. 
 
3.2 Macroeconomic and Financial Data 
We obtain quarterly and monthly (where available) US data for real gross domestic 
product (GDP), consumer price index (CPI), unemployment rate (UNEMP), 
consumption expenditures (CONS), investment (INV), industrial production index 
 
11 The variables (in quarterly frequency) used in the VAR analysis cover the period from 1988Q1 to 
2016Q4, except for the VAR model for the IPI which is employed in monthly frequency and covers the 
period 1988M1 to 2017M1. In the robustness section we additionally examine multivariate VAR models, 
in quarterly frequency, for the two main components of GDP; investment growth (ΔINV) and consumption 
expenditures growth (ΔCONS), and analogous multivariate VAR models, in monthly frequency, for the 
capacity utilization growth (ΔCU) and the unemployment rate (UNEMP), as alternative proxies of 
economic activity.     
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(IPI), capacity utilization (CU), M2 money supply (M2), economic policy uncertainty 
index (EPU), the 10-year US treasury bond rate and the 3-month US treasury bill rate 
from the Federal Reserve Bank of Saint Louis (FRED). We also obtain data for the S&P 
500 stock-market index from DataStream. The slope of the yield curve (TERM) is 
estimated as the difference between the 10-year US government bond yield and the 3-
month maturity US treasury bill rate. All the macroeconomic and financial data series 
cover the period from January 1988 to January 2017.12  
 
3.3 Descriptive Statistics  
Table 1 shows the descriptive statistics of the variables and the correlation matrix 
between commodity volatility series in the quarterly frequency.13  
 
[Insert Table 1 Here] 
 
From Table 1 we observe that energy commodity volatility series, such as the crude oil 
and petroleum, exhibit a higher mean compared to agricultural and metals commodity 
volatility series. In addition, the standard deviation of the realized variance series for 
energy commodity prices is much higher compared to the standard deviation of non-
energy realized variance series. This indicates that the time variation and the sudden 
swings in time-varying volatility are much higher in energy commodity markets when 
compared to agricultural and metals commodity markets. Moreover, Table 2 displays 
the correlation matrix of our commodity realized variance series.  
 
[Insert Table 2 Here] 
 
Table 2 shows that the correlations between commodity volatility series are positive 
and, in most cases, larger than 40%. These results are a first indication of significant 
co-movements in the volatility of commodity prices. Furthermore, we observe that the 
correlations between commodity realized variance series of the same commodity class 
 
12 All variables have been tested for stationarity and the null hypothesis of unit root have been rejected 
using both the Augmented Dickey-Fuller and the Philips-Perron unit root tests. The results of the unit root 
tests can be provided upon request. 
13 We use both quarterly and monthly time-series models in our empirical analysis. Our quarterly dataset 
consists of the period 1988Q1-2016Q4, while our monthly dataset covers the period 1988M1-2017M1. 
Here, we report the descriptive statistics for the quarterly dataset and the respective correlation matrix for 
the commodity volatility series in quarterly frequency. The descriptive statistics and correlation matrix 
for the monthly data exhibit a similar behavior with the quarterly sample. The tables for the monthly 
dataset can be provided upon request. 
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become even higher, which indicates that co-movement is stronger for commodity 
markets in the same class. 
 
4. Empirical Analysis 
4.1 OLS Predictive Regressions Results 
For an initial investigation of the impact of agricultural, energy and metals commodity 
markets uncertainty on US economic activity we use single-equation forecasting 
regression models. Following the output forecasting approach of Estrella and 
Hardouvelis (1991), we estimate bivariate OLS forecasting regressions in which we use 
the realized variance of commodity prices as the only predictor of economic activity, 
as follows:  
 
0 1t t k tGDP b bCOMRV − = + +  ,                                                  (4) 
 
where ΔGDP is the growth of real GDP and COMRV is the realized variance of 
agricultural, energy and metals commodity futures returns, respectively. The 
forecasting horizon ranges from 0 to 12 quarters. We additionally estimate the bivariate 
forecasting regressions of Equation (4) using the IPI growth (ΔIPI) as an alternative 
measure of economic activity in US.14 
 
Table 3 shows the regression results of our bivariate regression on real GDP growth 
using commodity price uncertainty as our only predictor.  
 
[Insert Table 3 Here] 
 
The results from Table 3 indicate that rising uncertainty in agricultural, metals and 
energy prices is associated with a significant drop in GDP growth. The estimated 
coefficients of the commodity price uncertainty series remain negative and statistically 
significant for forecasting horizons ranging from one up to six quarters ahead. When 
regressing the contemporaneous time-series of commodity price volatility on GDP 
 
14 The variables (in quarterly frequency) used in the regression analysis cover the period from 1988Q1 to 
2016Q4, except for the regressions for IPI which are employed in monthly frequency and cover the period 
1988M1 to 2017M1.  
13 
 
growth, we find that the volatility of metals and energy commodity prices are the most 
significant indicators of economic activity with adjusted R2 values reaching 29.8%, 
30.0% and 28.6% for the case of crude oil, gasoline and gold, respectively.  
 
These results, reinforce the previous evidence on the predictive ability of financial 
variables, and especially of the various measures of financial volatility, for economic 
activity (Schwert, 1989; Ferrara et al., 2014; Chauvet et al., 2015; among others). 
Furthermore, our findings are in line with Elder and Serletis (2010), Elder (2018) and 
Jo (2014), according to which oil uncertainty shocks are significant indicators of 
economic activity. On the other hand, our empirical analysis is the first to show that 
rising uncertainty in metals and in some agricultural markets (like wheat) are equally 
important indicators of falling economic activity. However, when we lengthen the 
forecasting horizon, we observe that the volatility of energy commodities like crude oil, 
petroleum and gasoline have a poorer forecasting ability when compared with the 
explanatory power of agricultural and metals commodities. For example, the adjusted 
R2 value of the bivariate regression falls from 10.2% (one quarter forecasting horizon) 
to 1.3% (two quarters forecasting horizon) when forecasting GDP growth using the 
realized variance of crude oil futures as a predictor, while the respective adjusted R2 
falls from 18.7% to 9.8% when using the realized variance of gold futures instead. Our 
results on the macroeconomic information content of commodity price volatility are 
broadly in line with findings of Kang et al. (2017) and Fernández et al. (2018), who 
find that fluctuations in commodity prices are a significant driver of macroeconomic 
fluctuations in US output and in small emerging market economies output.  
 
We additionally examine the effect of commodity price volatility on the industrial 
production index  growth (ΔIPI), in monthly frequency. Table 4 report the regression 
results of the bivariate OLS forecasting regression models for the monthly IPI growth. 
 
[Insert Table 4 Here] 
 
The results from Table 4 confirm the findings for GDP growth, and show that 
commodity uncertainty has a negative effect on industrial production growth. As 
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expected, the price uncertainty in the metals markets has the most significant impact on 
IPI growth.15  
 
4.2 Commodity Price Uncertainty and US Economic Recessions 
In this section, we follow the econometric approach of Estrella and Mishkin (1998) on 
the prediction of US recessions, using our measures of commodity price uncertainty. 
More specifically, we present the results based on the bivariate linear probability and 
probit models in which we predict the probability of US economic recessions (i.e. the 
right-hand-side variable in Equation (4) for these models is a binary (0-1) variable that 
indicates the NBER based US economic recessions (NBER)). Tables 5 and 6 show the 
results based on the bivariate linear probability and probit regression models 
respectively.  
 
[Tables 5 and 6 Here] 
 
The results, presented in Tables 5-6, clearly show the strong and significant predictive 
power of commodity price uncertainty for US economic recessions in both short- and 
long-term forecasting horizons. More specifically, our bivariate linear probability and 
probit regressions report positive and statistically significant coefficients for all 
commodity realized variance series in the short-term (for one- and two-month 
forecasting horizons). We additionally observe that the short-term predictive power of 
crude oil and petroleum price uncertainty is significantly higher compared to other non-
oil commodity volatility series. Our regression analysis clearly shows that oil price 
uncertainty is more closely associated with subsequent US economic recessions when 
compared to non-oil price uncertainty. Our results on the significant predictive power 
of oil price uncertainty (for short-term forecasting horizons) are broadly in line with the 
evidence in Hamilton (1983, 2003) and the recent empirical findings of Killian and 
Vigfusson (2017), who show that oil price shocks can act as leading indicators for US 
economic recessions. On the other hand, we observe that the predictive power of oil 
price uncertainty is significantly deteriorated for medium-term (three-month and six-
month) forecasting horizons, while the respective predictive power of some agricultural 
 
15 Following our baseline 8-factor model, used in the VAR analysis, we have estimated multivariate OLS 
predictive regressions in which we include these key macroeconomic and financial determinants of 
economic activity on the left-hand side of the predictive regression equation. The main findings, using 
this multivariate regression model, remain unaltered. These results are available upon request. 
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and metals commodities such as wheat, gold and platinum is significantly increased and 
thus these series can act as better indicators of US economic recessions for medium-
term forecasting horizons.16 In addition, Figure 1 shows the estimated recession 
probability based on the bivariate probit models when using agricultural, energy and 
metals price uncertainty as predictors of NBER recessions respectively.  
 
[Figure 1 Here] 
 
From Figure 1 we can easily observe that the rising probabilities of our probit models 
are associated with economic recessions in the US. More specifically, the estimated 
probabilities from the bivariate probit models corresponds to the observed episodes of 
US economic recessions. Figure 1 shows the high predictive power of crude oil and 
petroleum price uncertainty on US economic recessions when compared to the non-oil 
price uncertainty. The increased predictive power of oil price uncertainty on economic 
activity does not contrast our findings and the previous evidence by Bernanke et al. 
(1997, 2004), since this increased predictive power of oil price uncertainty on economic 
recessions may partially be due to increased monetary policy interventions. 
 
4.3 Multivariate VAR Results 
In this section we present the results of the baseline multivariate VAR model (as 
described in Equations (2) and (3)). We begin our analysis with the results from the 
Granger causality tests between commodity price uncertainty and economic activity 
derived from our baseline multivariate VAR model. The results of the Granger causality 
tests for the commodity uncertainty-GDP growth pair is shown in Table 7.17  
 
 [Insert Table 7 Here] 
 
 
16 This outcome is a first indication of our basic conclusions from our VAR analysis, according to which 
the recessionary impact of non-oil commodity markets uncertainty is found to be more long-lasting 
compared to the impact of uncertainty in oil commodity markets. 
17 Here we provide the results of the Granger causality tests for the main variables of interest (i.e. the 
commodity uncertainty-GDP growth pair). The full set of results for the Granger causality tests for all 
remaining variables in our VAR model can be provided upon request. In addition, we have also estimated 
the Granger causality tests for the commodity uncertainty-IPI growth pair as well as for the two 
components of GDP (ΔINV and ΔCONS). Our main findings are qualitatively similar. These additional 
results are provided upon request. 
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The results of Granger causality tests presented in Table 7 show that price uncertainty 
in the agricultural and metals markets like corn, wheat, silver and gold Granger cause 
GDP growth. So, these tests identify a unidirectional causality from the majority of 
agricultural and metals markets to US economic activity. On the other hand, we do not 
find any significant causality running from energy commodity markets to US economic 
activity (i.e., we fail to reject the hypothesis of no causality from energy markets to 
GDP growth). In addition, when examining the reverse channel of causality, our tests 
show that the only significant causal relationship is from US economic activity to 
energy price uncertainty. Hence, according to these tests, the changes in US economic 
activity, do Granger cause oil price uncertainty, while they do not (Granger) cause 
uncertainty in agricultural and metals commodity markets. Our results are the first to 
identify this reverse channel of causality between oil price uncertainty and the 
macroeconomy. The findings of the relevant literature so far have shown that oil price 
uncertainty shocks have a significant negative impact on US macroeconomy (Elder and 
Serletis, 2010; Elder, 2018; Jo, 2014; Ferderer, 1996). Our evidence here, is that the 
causal relationship is not from oil uncertainty shocks to macroeconomic fluctuations, 
but from US economic activity to oil and, in general, energy price uncertainty. Our 
results are broadly in line with the more recent empirical findings which show that 
macro-uncertainty shocks have a significant effect in uncertainty in oil and energy 
markets (Bakas and Triantafyllou, 2018; Joets et al., 2017; Van Robays, 2016).  
 
We continue our VAR analysis by estimating the dynamic responses of unexpected 
commodity price uncertainty shocks on US economic activity and its components. 
More specifically, we present the estimated orthogonalized impulse response functions 
(IRFs), in which the shocks are identified using a Cholesky decomposition, for our 
baseline multivariate VAR model described in Equations (2) and (3).18,19 Figure 2 
shows the estimated IRFs for the VAR models of GDP growth in which we use the 
agricultural (corn, cotton, soybeans, wheat), energy (crude oil, heating oil, gasoline, 
 
18 Here we provide the estimated IRFs of commodity uncertainty shocks on the measure of economic 
activity in the VAR model (GDP growth). The full set of the estimated IRFs for all the variables included 
in our VAR model can be provided upon request. 
19 For robustness purposes, we have also estimated orthogonalized IRFs, using a Cholesky decomposition 
with alternative orderings for the variables in our VAR model. Furthermore, for additional robustness, we 
have estimated the generalized IRFs which do not require orthogonalization of shocks and, unlike the 
impulse responses on orthogonalized shocks, are insensitive to the choice of the ordering of variables in 
the VAR model (see Pesaran and Shin, 1998). Our main findings remain unaltered when we estimate 
either the generalized IRFs, or the orthogonalized IRFs with alternative VAR orderings. The set of these 
additional results can be provided upon request.    
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petroleum) and metals (copper, gold, silver, platinum) price volatility series as proxies 
for commodity price uncertainty.  
 
[Insert Figure 2 Here] 
 
The IRFs, from Figure 2, show that agricultural and metals commodity price 
uncertainty shocks have a negative and long-lasting impact on US GDP growth. 
Specifically, our VAR analysis shows that rising volatility in some precious metals and 
agricultural prices, like platinum, gold and wheat, has a more negative and long-lasting 
impact on US GDP growth when compared with the respective macroeconomic effects 
of energy price uncertainty shocks. The results of our VAR model show that a positive 
one-standard-deviation shock in the volatility of wheat prices reduces GDP growth by 
almost 10 basis points one quarter after the initial volatility shock, with the effect 
remaining negative and statistically significant for five quarters after the initial shock. 
In addition, our VAR analysis shows that a positive one-standard-deviation shock in 
the realized variance of platinum futures prices reduces GDP growth almost 12 basis 
points two quarters after the initial uncertainty shock, with the effect remaining 
significant for four quarters after the initial platinum uncertainty shock. On the other 
hand, the estimated response of US GDP growth to energy price uncertainty shock is 
statistically insignificant (statistically indistinguishable from zero) for all energy 
commodity markets considered. In our multivariate VAR model, we control for 
monetary policy (money supply - M2) and inflation, so we are able to control for any 
possible interactions between monetary policy, inflation and commodity price 
volatility. In addition, we control for both macroeconomic and financial uncertainty 
(EPU and SP500RV) and thus we are able to account for possible interactions between 
commodity price volatility and uncertainty that stems from the broader macroeconomic 
and financial environment.20       
 
Our findings are line with those of Bernanke et al. (2004), Carlstrom and Fuerst (2006) 
and Cologni and Manera (2008) who show that it is difficult to infer whether US 
 
20 Following the work of Bakas and Triantafyllou (2018), which shows that unobserved macroeconomic 
uncertainty have a stronger effect on the volatility of commodity prices compared to observable measures 
of economic uncertainty, we additionally estimate the baseline multivariate VAR model where we replace 
EPU with the unobservable macroeconomic uncertainty measure (MU) of Jurado et al. (2015). Our main 
findings do not change when we control for the unobserved macroeconomic uncertainty in the VAR 
model. These results can be provided upon request.    
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economic recessions have occurred because of oil prices or subsequent monetary policy 
reactions and that a significant part of the recessionary effects of oil price shocks is due 
to the systematic monetary policy reaction function. Oil shocks are frequently being 
followed by reactions of monetary policy and that overall, it is difficult to disentangle 
the recessionary impact of oil price shocks and monetary policy changes, which many 
times occur simultaneously (Bernanke et al., 1997; 2004; Carstrom and Fuerst, 2006; 
Kara, 2017). Our results are also in line and provide further insights to the findings of 
Ferraro and Peretto (2018) who show that commodity prices are associated with short-
run growth of commodity-rich economies. Here, we additionally show that commodity 
price volatility shocks are significantly (negatively) associated and also have a negative 
dynamic effect on US real GDP growth. Assuming the same type of endogeneity 
between commodity price uncertainty and monetary policy, we control for possible 
interactions between monetary policy and commodity price uncertainty by including as 
endogenous variables the money supply growth (ΔM2) and inflation (INFL) in our VAR 
model. Thus, the estimated IRFs show the net impact of commodity price uncertainty 
shocks on US economic activity.21  
 
Unlike the empirical analysis of Elder and Serletis (2010) and Jo (2014), who do not 
control for inflation and systematic monetary policy shocks, in our VAR model we 
control for the possible interactions between monetary policy, inflation and commodity 
price uncertainty in order to measure the net real macroeconomic impact of unexpected 
random shocks in commodity price uncertainty. Our VAR estimates are broadly in line 
with the findings of Bernanke et al. (1997; 2004) and Kara (2017) since we find that 
the impact of oil price uncertainty shocks on US economic growth is significantly 
deteriorated when we control for monetary policy and inflation in our VAR model; 
thus, we implicitly allow for possible interactions between commodity price uncertainty 
shocks and monetary policy changes.22 Our analysis implicitly reveals that the reduced 
impact of oil price uncertainty shocks on US GDP growth may be attributed to the fact 
 
21 We additionally estimate a structural VAR (SVAR) model in which we restrict monetary policy to have 
no systematic reaction to commodity price uncertainty shocks. Even under this VAR identification 
scheme, our basic findings remain unaltered. The impact of agricultural and metals commodity price 
uncertainty shocks remains negative and statistically significant irrespective of the systematic (or random) 
interactions of monetary policy with commodity price fluctuations. These additional results based on the 
SVAR model can be provided upon request. 
22 Our results remain robust to the inclusion of alternative monetary policy instruments like the Federal 
funds rate and the 3-month US Treasury Bill rate. These additional results can be provided upon request. 
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that these shocks are either inflationary and, as a consequence, do not pass to the real 
economy, or they result in a systematic reaction of the monetary authority (through 
contractionary monetary policy), which in turn reduces output. Thus, our analysis 
implicitly shows that oil shocks primarily affect the monetary (nominal) and not the 
real part of the macroeconomy. On the other hand, the impact of non-oil price 
uncertainty shocks, such as shocks in wheat, gold and platinum price variability, 
remains robust to the inclusion of inflation, monetary policy and other macroeconomic 
factors directly related to economic activity. These results clearly show that, in sharp 
contrast to oil shocks, the agricultural and metals commodity price uncertainty shocks 
have a purely macroeconomic (recessionary) impact and, thus, they can act as leading 
indicators of economic activity. The policy implication of our empirical findings is that 
monetary authorities should consider to target also the commodity price uncertainty of 
non-oil commodity market uncertainty. This policy may be feasible since commodity 
prices are significantly affected by changes in interest rates and monetary policy 
(Anzuini et al., 2013; Frankel and Hardouvelis, 1985; Gubler and Hertweck, 2013; 
Hammoudeh et al., 2015). Moreover, according to the empirical findings of 
Triantafyllou and Dotsis (2017), US monetary policy is capable of affecting the option-
implied uncertainty on agricultural commodity markets. 
 
We also estimate a similar VAR model (as given in Equations (2) and (3)) in which 
we use the industrial production growth as our proxy for economic activity (ΔIPI is 
now the first variable in the VAR ordering) – this VAR model is estimated in monthly 
frequency. Figure 3 shows the estimated orthogonalized IRFs of our VAR model when 
using agricultural, energy and metals price volatility series as the commodity 
uncertainty measure.  
 
[Insert Figure 3 Here] 
 
Figure 3 shows that an unexpected positive uncertainty shock in agricultural markets 
like corn and wheat has a long-lasting impact on the IPI growth in the US when 
compared to the respective effect of energy and metals price volatility. For example, a 
one-standard-deviation shock in wheat price uncertainty reduces IPI growth by almost 
8 basis points one month after the initial shock with the effect remaining negative and 
statistically significant for ten months after the initial shock. On the other hand, the 
response of industrial production growth to energy price uncertainty shocks is more 
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transitory since the negative effect disappears 2-3 months after the initial energy 
uncertainty shock.23 Overall, the results based on the monthly frequency VAR model 
are in line with our quarterly VAR. Our findings show that, albeit in line with the oil-
macroeconomy literature, according to which energy price shocks have a negative 
impact on economic activity in US (Elder and Serletis, 2010; Elder, 2018; Jo, 2014), 
the effect of energy markets is transitory and vanishes after a 3-months period, that is 
one quarter after the initial shock. These results are also in line with the findings of our 
forecasting regression models, according to which, the predictive power of oil price 
uncertainty is significant and relatively higher for short-term forecasting horizon, while 
it vanishes for medium and long-term forecasting horizon. On the other hand, the 
negative impact of agricultural and metals price uncertainty shocks remains significant 
for about one year after the initial shock. 
 
5. Robustness Checks 
In this section we provide the results of our robustness checks. In specific, we estimate 
the same multivariate VAR models for the two main components of GDP; that is 
investment growth (ΔINV) and consumption expenditures growth (ΔCONS), and for the 
growth of capacity utilization (ΔCU) and the unemployment rate (UNEMP) as 
alternative proxies of economic activity. We start by estimating an identical VAR 
model, given in Equations (2) and (3), in which we use investment growth (ΔINV) 
instead of GDP growth as the first variable in the VAR ordering. Using this VAR 
model, we measure the impact of random shocks in the time-varying uncertainty of 
commodity markets on the investment component of the US output. Figure 4 shows 
the respective orthogonalized IRFs of investment growth based on the multivariate 
VAR models.  
 
[Insert Figure 4 Here] 
 
From Figure 4, we observe that a positive shock in the realized variance of corn, wheat, 
gold and platinum results to significant drops in US investment growth. More 
specifically, an unexpected positive one-standard-deviation shock in the realized 
 
23 The results based on the VAR model in monthly frequency, where we use IPI growth as proxy of 
economic activity, reaffirm our previous evidence, which are based on the VAR model in quarterly 
frequency using the measure of real GDP growth as proxy, and furthermore shows that our findings are 
robust to the estimation of the VAR model in different frequencies (quarterly/monthly). 
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variance of corn and wheat futures leads to a drop of approximately 40 basis points in 
US investment growth in one quarter after the initial uncertainty shock, with the effect 
remaining negative and statistically significant for six quarters after the initial shock. 
In addition, a positive price uncertainty shock in the gold futures market reduces US 
investment growth by nearly 40 basis points two quarters after the initial shock, while 
a platinum uncertainty shock results to a reduction of investment of about 50 basis 
points two quarters after the platinum shock, with both effects remaining significantly 
negative for five quarters after the initial metals uncertainty shocks. On the other hand, 
energy price uncertainty shocks have a rather small and transitory negative impact on 
US investment growth.  
 
We also estimate the baseline VAR model in which we use consumption expenditures 
growth (ΔCONS) as the first variable in the VAR ordering (Equation (3)). Figure 5 
shows the estimated orthogonalized IRFs for agricultural, energy and metals 
uncertainty shocks respectively.  
 
[Figure 5 Here] 
 
The estimated IRFs (Figure 5) clearly show that the impact of agricultural volatility 
shocks in US consumption growth is larger in magnitude and more persistent as 
opposed the impact of energy volatility shocks. We observe that a positive shock in the 
realized variance of corn, cotton and wheat results to significant drops in consumption 
growth. For example, a one-standard-deviation shock in corn price uncertainty leads to 
a drop of 10 basis points in consumption growth in about three quarters after the initial 
shock. These results reinforce the evidence that agricultural commodities are largely 
related with consumption. However, we also find that metals commodity markets, like 
gold and platinum, have also a negative dynamic effect on US consumption growth. 
These findings are in line with Edelstein and Killian (2009), who show that energy price 
shocks result in a reduction in consumer spending, since they can create sudden shifts 
in precautionary savings and changes in the cost of energy-usage durables. We extend 
here this empirical finding by showing that, apart from energy price spikes, price 
uncertainty in both energy and non-energy commodity markets has persistently 
negative impact on aggregate consumption expenditures. 
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In addition, we estimate the baseline VAR model with capacity utilization growth 
(ΔCU) as the first variable in the VAR ordering (Equation (3)) – this VAR model is 
also estimated in monthly frequency. Figure 6 shows the estimated orthogonalized 
IRFs for agricultural, energy and metals uncertainty shocks respectively.  
 
[Figure 6 Here] 
 
The estimated IRFs (Figure 6) provide a similar evidence with that from the other 
measures of economic activity; that the impact of agricultural volatility shocks in US 
capacity utilization growth are larger in magnitude and more persistent as opposed to 
the impact of energy volatility shocks. 
 
Finally, we estimate the baseline VAR model, in monthly frequency, where we explore 
the dynamic responses of commodity price uncertainty shocks on the unemployment 
rate (UNEMP) - as another proxy for the US economic activity.24 Figure 7 shows the 
estimated orthogonalized IRFs for agricultural, energy and metals uncertainty shocks 
respectively.  
 
[Figure 7 Here] 
 
The estimated IRFs (Figure 7) clearly show that the impact of agricultural volatility 
shocks is larger in magnitude and more persistent as opposed the impact of energy 
volatility shocks. For example, a shock in corn price uncertainty increases US 
unemployment rate by approximately 8 basis points with the effect remaining positive 
and statistically significant for almost 35 months after the initial shock. On the other 
hand, except from platinum, the energy and metals commodity price uncertainty has a 
lower effect (in magnitude and persistence) on US unemployment rate.  
 
These additional results provide further robustness to our main findings and 
conclusions from the main VAR analysis since all alternative proxies of economic 
activity are found to be negatively affected by agricultural and metals markets 
 
24 The VAR model used here is the baseline 8-factor VAR (described in Equation (3)) in monthly 
frequency in which the industrial production growth (ΔIPI) is placed first and the unemployment rate 
(UNEMP) is placed third in the VAR ordering. For robustness purposes, we have also estimated a VAR 
model where we reverse the ordering of these two variables, and our findings remain qualitatively the 
same. These additional results can be provided upon request.  
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uncertainty shocks, while the respective impact from the energy uncertainty shocks is 
found to be much smaller. 
 
6. Conclusions 
Motivated by the real options approach of the theory of investment under uncertainty, 
we empirically examine the impact of commodity price uncertainty on US economic 
activity. Our paper differentiates from the previous literature since we empirically 
examine the impact of both oil and non-oil commodity price uncertainty shocks on US 
macroeconomy using a class of agricultural, metals and energy commodities. Our 
empirical analysis reveals that uncertainty in agricultural, energy and metals markets 
has significant predictive information content on economic activity. Rising uncertainty 
in all commodity markets is associated with slumps in US GDP and its components and 
with economic recessions. However, our VAR analysis for the first time shows that the 
causality between oil price uncertainty and US macroeconomy is unidirectional and 
runs from output fluctuations to oil price uncertainty and not the opposite. On the other 
hand, the dynamic effects of uncertainty in many agricultural and metals commodities 
have a long-lasting negative impact on US economic activity and its components, such 
as investment and consumption expenditures. Our VAR analysis shows that aggregate 
investment is the component of GDP which is more sensitive to agricultural and metals 
commodity price uncertainty shocks, hence, we implicitly verify the real options model 
of investment under uncertainty when the uncertainty shock is modeled as the rising 
volatility in commodity markets. Furthermore, when controlling for the monetary 
policy stance, we find that the recessionary impact of energy shocks is significantly 
reduced. Our results are in line with the findings of Bernanke et al. (1997; 2004) who 
show that the predictive power of oil shocks is significantly reduced when controlling 
for monetary policy in the VAR model. Although the non-oil price uncertainty shocks 
have a larger and more persistent negative impact on economic activity, our findings 
implicitly reveal that these types of uncertainty shocks have not been taken into 
consideration by policy-makers. Hence, our findings implicitly reveal as policy 
implications the need of the inclusion of agricultural and metals markets uncertainty 
into the central bank information variable set when making predictions on future 
economic activity, and thus adopting proactive monetary policies by monitoring 
variables which could act as non-standard indicators of future macroeconomic 
downturns (Woodford, 1994). The more careful consideration of non-oil commodity 
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fluctuations and rising uncertainty in agricultural and metals futures markets might be 
another non-conventional monetary policy in order to ameliorate the recessionary 
impact of commodity market turbulence. 
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Tables and Figures 
 
 
 
Table 1. Descriptive Statistics 
 Mean Std. Dev. Minimum Maximum Skewness Kurtosis 
ΔGDP 0.006 0.006 -0.021 0.019 -1.169 6.555 
ΔIPI 0.004 0.012 -0.056 0.025 -2.017 9.306 
ΔINV 0.010 0.024 -0.096 0.058 -1.014 5.610 
ΔCONS 0.012 0.006 -0.026 0.026 -2.040 13.438 
ΔCU -0.001 0.012 -0.059 0.026 -1.629 8.446 
SP500RV 0.030 0.047 0.004 0.441 6.386 54.028 
EPU 4.627 0.287 4.083 5.288 0.403 2.422 
TERM 0.018 0.011 -0.006 0.036 -0.223 1.952 
INFL 0.006 0.005 -0.023 0.017 -1.763 11.941 
ΔM2 0.013 0.007 -0.003 0.046 0.652 5.638 
UNEMP 0.061 0.015 0.039 0.101 0.999 3.207 
COMRV       
Corn 0.059 0.046 0.006 0.311 2.039 10.011 
Cotton 0.057 0.040 0.012 0.271 2.439 10.920 
Soybeans 0.050 0.036 0.006 0.212 1.925 7.251 
Wheat 0.071 0.052 0.009 0.305 1.827 7.005 
Crude oil 0.119 0.119 0.016 0.769 3.383 16.460 
Heating oil 0.104 0.086 0.015 0.652 3.174 17.686 
Petroleum 0.099 0.095 0.012 0.633 3.499 18.099 
Gasoline 0.112 0.096 0.014 0.742 3.584 20.829 
Copper 0.065 0.069 0.012 0.522 3.745 21.350 
Gold 0.025 0.023 0.002 0.143 2.552 10.923 
Platinum 0.044 0.036 0.006 0.249 3.257 17.331 
Silver 0.078 0.075 0.009 0.479 2.924 13.419 
T = 116 Quarters 
 
     
Notes: The descriptive statistics are based on the balanced dataset of the 12 agricultural, energy and 
metals commodities and the macroeconomic and financial time-series for the quarterly dataset over the 
period 1988Q1 to 2016Q4. 
 
 
 
Table 2. Correlation Matrix for the Agricultural, Energy and Metals Commodity Markets 
 Corn Cotton Soybeans Wheat Crude 
oil 
Heating 
oil 
Petroleum Gasoline Copper Gold Platinum Silver 
Corn 1.000            
Cotton 0.619 1.000           
Soybeans 0.763 0.548 1.000          
Wheat 0.751 0.623 0.591 1.000         
Crude oil 0.260 0.268 0.241 0.219 1.000        
Heating oil 0.140 0.220 0.193 0.126 0.928 1.000       
Petroleum 0.269 0.292 0.265 0.227 0.991 0.956 1.000      
Gasoline 0.364 0.396 0.361 0.284 0.912 0.906 0.942 1.000     
Copper 0.555 0.387 0.422 0.428 0.413 0.300 0.421 0.502 1.000    
Gold 0.584 0.404 0.452 0.499 0.463 0.366 0.468 0.538 0.628 1.000   
Platinum 0.568 0.412 0.560 0.466 0.484 0.387 0.498 0.532 0.530 0.719 1.000  
Silver 0.619 0.510 0.436 0.539 0.346 0.218 0.351 0.423 0.672 0.806 0.587 1.000 
Notes: The agricultural commodities consist of corn, cotton, soybeans and wheat, while the energy commodities consist of crude 
oil, heating oil, petroleum and gasoline, and finally, the metals commodities consist of copper, gold, platinum and silver. 
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Table 3. Forecasting Gross Domestic Product Growth with Commodity Price Uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Estimated b1 coefficients 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn -0.049** -0.050** -0.034** -0.021* -0.038* -0.005 
Cotton -0.063** -0.042** -0.026* -0.018 -0.006 -0.001 
Soybeans -0.047 -0.047 -0.040 -0.013 -0.029* -0.017 
Wheat -0.045** -0.042** -0.039** -0.035 -0.021* -0.008 
Crude oil -0.028*** -0.017*** -0.007** -0.004 0.007** 0.004 
Heating oil -0.032*** -0.018* -0.008 -0.006 0.006 0.001 
Petroleum -0.035*** -0.021** -0.009** -0.006* 0.008* 0.003 
Gasoline -0.035*** -0.025*** -0.011*** -0.007** 0.004 -0.003 
Copper -0.036** -0.024** -0.012** -0.011 -0.014 -0.006 
Gold -0.139*** -0.109** -0.085*** -0.062*** -0.030 -0.034 
Platinum -0.077*** -0.073*** -0.053*** -0.041*** -0.002 -0.005 
Silver -0.035** -0.027* -0.013 -0.009 -0.004 -0.005 
 
Panel B: Adjusted R2 values 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn 13.0 13.6 5.9 1.7 7.6 -0.8 
Cotton 17.3 7.3 2.2 0.6 -0.8 -1.0 
Soybeans 7.5 7.2 5.1 -0.3 2.1 0.1 
Wheat 14.3 12.6 10.7 8.4 2.4 -0.5 
Crude oil 29.8 10.2 1.3 -0.2 0.8 -0.3 
Heating oil 20.6 5.6 0.4 -0.3 -0.2 -1.0 
Petroleum 29.1 10.2 1.3 -0.1 0.7 -0.7 
Gasoline 30.0 14.6 2.4 0.6 -0.5 -0.7 
Copper 16.0 7.0 1.0 0.8 1.6 -0.4 
Gold 28.6 17.2 10.2 5.1 0.5 1.0 
Platinum 21.4 18.7 9.8 5.6 -0.9 -0.9 
Silver 19.1 10.4 1.7 0.5 -0.7 -0.6 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table presents the results of the bivariate forecasting 
regression model on gross domestic product growth (ΔGDP) using the realized variance series of 
agricultural, energy and metals commodity futures returns. The forecasting horizon ranges from 0 to 
12 quarters. COMRV is the realized variance and ΔGDP is the GDP growth. The standard errors are 
corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1987) estimator. The 
estimated beta coefficients are based on the following bivariate regressions: 𝛥ܩܦ ?ܲ? = 𝑏଴ +𝑏ଵܥܱܯ𝑅𝑉𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡. 
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Table 4. Forecasting Industrial Production Growth with Commodity Price Uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Estimated b1 coefficients 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn -0.027** -0.024 -0.025* -0.029** -0.013 -0.008 
Cotton -0.030** -0.027 -0.026 -0.022 -0.019 -0.002 
Soybeans -0.027* -0.028 -0.031* -0.033* -0.022 -0.008 
Wheat -0.023** -0.025* -0.020** -0.026** -0.028** -0.012 
Crude oil -0.014** -0.014*** -0.012*** -0.011** -0.004 -0.001 
Heating oil -0.015** -0.014** -0.014** -0.011* -0.004 -0.003 
Petroleum -0.017** -0.016*** -0.015** -0.013** -0.005 -0.002 
Gasoline -0.019*** -0.018*** -0.016*** -0.015*** -0.006* -0.002 
Copper -0.010 -0.017** -0.021** -0.016* -0.004 0.000 
Gold -0.082*** -0.054** -0.064** -0.074*** -0.041* -0.010 
Platinum -0.053*** -0.040*** -0.042*** -0.048*** -0.037*** -0.004 
Silver -0.014* -0.013* -0.015 -0.014 -0.008 0.003 
 
Panel B: Adjusted R2 values 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn 5.1 4.3 4.7 6.3 1.1 0.2 
Cotton 4.6 3.7 3.4 2.4 1.6 -0.3 
Soybeans 3.5 3.9 4.7 5.4 2.2 0.0 
Wheat 5.4 6.2 3.8 6.9 7.8 1.1 
Crude oil 12.2 11.5 8.9 7.0 0.5 -0.2 
Heating oil 7.7 6.5 6.3 4.5 0.3 0.0 
Petroleum 10.9 10.5 8.5 6.6 0.6 -0.1 
Gasoline 13.6 12.1 9.5 8.8 1.3 -0.1 
Copper 1.4 4.5 7.1 3.9 0.0 -0.3 
Gold 14.2 6.0 8.5 11.6 3.3 -0.1 
Platinum 14.6 8.2 8.7 11.8 6.7 -0.2 
Silver 3.8 3.4 4.6 3.9 1.0 -0.1 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table presents the results of the bivariate forecasting 
regression model on the industrial production index growth (ΔIPI) using the realized variance series 
of agricultural, energy and metals commodity futures returns. The forecasting horizon ranges from 0 
to 12 months. COMRV is the realized variance and ΔIPI is the industrial production index growth. The 
standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1987) 
estimator. The estimated beta coefficients are based on the following bivariate regressions: 𝛥𝐼ܲ𝐼𝑡 =𝑏଴ + 𝑏ଵܥܱܯ𝑅𝑉𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡. 
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Table 5. Forecasting US Economic Recessions with Commodity Price Uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Estimated b1 coefficients 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn 1.341* 1.202 1.226 1.272 0.948 0.223 
Cotton 1.799** 1.621* 1.390 1.288 0.825 -0.338 
Soybeans 1.874** 1.794* 1.841** 1.827** 1.286 0.092 
Wheat 1.532** 1.463** 1.435** 1.436** 1.179* 0.526 
Crude oil 0.979*** 0.925*** 0.911*** 0.636** 0.316 -0.107 
Heating oil 1.109*** 1.049*** 1.010*** 0.616* 0.352 -0.051 
Petroleum 1.166*** 1.095*** 1.082*** 0.727** 0.404 -0.101 
Gasoline 1.166*** 1.104*** 1.110*** 0.811** 0.529* -0.056 
Copper 0.991** 0.946** 0.951** 0.912** 0.638* 0.106 
Gold 4.064*** 4.122*** 4.321*** 3.798*** 2.646** 0.134 
Platinum 3.135*** 2.942*** 2.814*** 2.520*** 1.671* 0.322 
Silver 0.838* 0.769 0.761 0.663 0.426 -0.315 
 
Panel B: Adjusted R2 values 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn 5.8 4.6 4.8 5.1 2.7 -0.1 
Cotton 7.4 5.9 4.3 3.6 1.3 0.0 
Soybeans 7.6 7.0 7.3 7.2 3.4 -0.3 
Wheat 10.4 9.4 9.1 9.1 6.0 1.0 
Crude oil 25.4 22.6 21.9 10.5 2.4 0.0 
Heating oil 19.0 16.9 15.7 5.7 1.6 -0.3 
Petroleum 23.9 21.1 20.6 9.1 2.6 -0.1 
Gasoline 22.5 20.2 20.4 10.7 4.4 -0.2 
Copper 6.9 6.3 6.3 5.8 2.7 -0.2 
Gold 15.2 15.6 17.2 13.2 6.3 -0.3 
Platinum 22.1 19.5 17.7 14.2 6.1 -0.1 
Silver 6.2 5.1 5.0 3.7 1.4 0.6 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table presents the results of the bivariate linear 
probability forecasting regression model on US economic recessions (NBER) using the realized 
variance series of agricultural, energy and metals commodity futures returns. The forecasting horizon 
ranges from 0 to 12 months. COMRV is the realized variance and NBER is the US economic recessions 
index. The standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-
West (1987) estimator. The estimated beta coefficients are based on the following linear probability 
bivariate regressions: ܰܤܧ𝑅𝑡 = 𝑏଴ + 𝑏ଵܥܱܯ𝑅𝑉𝑡−𝑘 + 𝜀𝑡. 
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Table 6. Forecasting US Economic Recessions with Commodity Price Uncertainty 
 
Panel A: Estimated b1 coefficients 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn 5.661** 5.080* 5.197* 5.417** 4.053 1.251 
Cotton 7.548** 6.794** 5.836* 5.404* 3.530 -2.202 
Soybeans 7.812** 7.482** 7.716** 7.660** 5.361 0.516 
Wheat 6.103** 5.812** 5.677** 5.657** 4.659* 2.305 
Crude oil 5.497*** 4.911*** 4.767*** 2.096 1.196 -1.129 
Heating oil 6.840*** 6.213*** 5.797*** 2.125 1.376 -0.386 
Petroleum 6.879*** 6.061*** 5.913*** 2.382 1.484 -0.956 
Gasoline 6.010*** 5.392*** 5.455*** 2.799* 1.923* -0.411 
Copper 3.943** 3.747** 3.772** 3.602** 2.561** 0.610 
Gold 16.389*** 16.736*** 17.648*** 15.270*** 10.712*** 0.804 
Platinum 13.682*** 12.393*** 11.528*** 10.069*** 6.225** 1.590 
Silver 3.230** 2.951* 2.912* 2.529 1.668 -3.199 
 
Panel B: Pseudo R2 values 
Horizon (k) k=0 k=1 k=2 k=3 k=6 k=12 
Corn 6.8 5.5 5.7 6.2 3.5 0.3 
Cotton 8.7 7.0 5.2 4.4 1.9 0.5 
Soybeans 8.8 8.1 8.6 8.4 4.2 0.0 
Wheat 11.1 10.2 9.8 9.7 6.6 1.5 
Crude oil 28.7 24.8 23.9 10.0 2.9 0.7 
Heating oil 24.0 20.9 18.9 5.9 2.2 0.1 
Petroleum 27.9 23.8 23.0 8.7 3.0 0.4 
Gasoline 24.1 21.0 21.3 10.4 4.7 0.1 
Copper 7.2 6.6 6.7 6.1 3.2 0.1 
Gold 16.1 16.6 18.3 14.1 7.1 0.0 
Platinum 23.3 20.1 18.0 14.4 6.2 0.3 
Silver 6.7 5.6 5.5 4.2 1.8 2.1 
Notes: * p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01. The table presents the results of the bivariate probit 
forecasting regression model on US economic recessions (NBER) using the realized variance series of 
agricultural, energy and metals commodity futures returns. The forecasting horizon ranges from 0 to 
12 months. COMRV is the realized variance and NBER is the US economic recessions index. The 
standard errors are corrected for autocorrelation and heteroscedasticity using the Newey-West (1987) 
estimator. The estimated beta coefficients are based on the following probit bivariate regressions: ܲሺܰܤܧ𝑅𝑡 = 1ሻ = ܨሺ𝑏଴ + 𝑏ଵܥܱܯ𝑅𝑉𝑡−𝑘ሻ. 
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Table 7. Granger Causality Tests between Gross Domestic Product Growth and 
Commodity Price Uncertainty 
 
Panel A 
Dependent variable Independent variable Chi-square p-value 
ΔGDP  Corn 29.831*** 0.008 
ΔGDP Cotton 0.972 0.615 
ΔGDP  Soybeans 2.738 0.254 
ΔGDP Wheat 8.725** 0.013 
ΔGDP Crude oil 2.216 0.330 
ΔGDP Heating oil 2.858 0.240 
ΔGDP Petroleum 1.935 0.380 
ΔGDP Gasoline 0.692 0.707 
ΔGDP Copper 0.275 0.871 
ΔGDP Gold 4.555* 0.100 
ΔGDP Silver 4.817* 0.090 
ΔGDP Platinum 5.097* 0.078 
 
Panel B 
Dependent variable Independent variable Chi-square p-value 
Corn ΔGDP  0.314 0.843 
Cotton ΔGDP 0.979 0.613 
Soybeans ΔGDP 0.509 0.775 
Wheat ΔGDP 0.485 0.785 
Crude oil ΔGDP 5.779* 0.056 
Heating oil ΔGDP 10.875*** 0.004 
Petroleum ΔGDP 7.385** 0.025 
Gasoline ΔGDP 8.633** 0.013 
Copper ΔGDP 0.257 0.859 
Gold ΔGDP 2.507 0.285 
Silver ΔGDP 3.627 0.163 
Platinum ΔGDP 0.568 0.753 
Notes: The table shows the results of the Granger causality tests between commodity price 
uncertainty and gross domestic product growth (ΔGDP). The tests refer to the baseline multivariate 
VAR model presented in Equation (3). The optimal lag-length is based on the Schwarz criterion. 
The null hypothesis is that the independent variable does not Granger cause the dependent variable. 
*, ** and *** denotes the rejection of the null hypothesis of no causality at the 10%, 5% and 1% level 
respectively. 
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Figure 1. Estimated Recession Probability from the Bivariate Probit Model for 
Commodity Markets 
 
            Agricultural Markets                    Energy Markets                        Metals Markets 
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Figure 2. Response of GDP Growth to Commodity Price Uncertainty Shocks 
 
 
 Agricultural Markets           Energy Markets               Metals Markets 
 
Notes: The solid red line shows the estimated IRFs and the grey shaded area show the 
corresponding 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. The 
estimated orthogonalized IRFs are expressed in percentages (%).  
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Figure 3. Response of IPI Growth to Commodity Price Uncertainty Shocks 
 
 
Agricultural Markets           Energy Markets               Metals Markets 
 
Notes: The solid red line shows the estimated IRFs and the grey shaded area show the 
corresponding 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. The 
estimated orthogonalized IRFs are expressed in percentages (%).  
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Figure 4. Response of Investment Growth to Commodity Price Uncertainty Shocks 
 
 
Agricultural Markets           Energy Markets               Metals Markets 
 
Notes: The solid red line shows the estimated IRFs and the grey shaded area show the 
corresponding 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. The 
estimated orthogonalized IRFs are expressed in percentages (%).  
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Figure 5. Response of Consumption Growth to Commodity Price Uncertainty Shocks 
 
 
Agricultural Markets           Energy Markets               Metals Markets 
 
Notes: The solid red line shows the estimated IRFs and the grey shaded area show the 
corresponding 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. The 
estimated orthogonalized IRFs are expressed in percentages (%).  
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Figure 6. Response of Capacity Utilization to Commodity Price Uncertainty Shocks 
 
 
Agricultural Markets           Energy Markets               Metals Markets 
 
Notes: The solid red line shows the estimated IRFs and the grey shaded area show the 
corresponding 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. The 
estimated orthogonalized IRFs are expressed in percentages (%).  
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Figure 7. Response of Unemployment Rate to Commodity Price Uncertainty Shocks 
 
 
Agricultural Markets           Energy Markets               Metals Markets 
 
Notes: The solid red line shows the estimated IRFs and the grey shaded area show the 
corresponding 90% bootstrapped confidence intervals based on 1,000 replications. The 
estimated orthogonalized IRFs are expressed in percentages (%).  
 
 
 
